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INTRODUCTION
Gabby Petito’s disappearance gripped the nation during the
summer of 2021. Millions of Americans and people across the globe
viewed the body camera footage depicting what appeared to be the
aftermath of a domestic dispute between Gabby and her fiancée, with
indications of underlying abuse and harm. 1 The world watched as a
broken family pled for information, and—despite all odds—longed for
her safe return. However, like the distraught families of so many
others, when a body was found matching Gabby’s description, their

*J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. I would like to thank my father for his constant support and
encouragement as well as my mother, whose love of reading and writing has inspired
me all of my life. I would further like to thank my fiancé for his constant patience
and well-timed humor, they have provided immeasurable relief throughout this
process. I would like to dedicate this piece to my grandmothers, Mildred Musick,
undoubtedly the strongest woman I have ever known, and Leona Klimek, the woman
that saw to it that I could live out my dreams. I also wish to acknowledge Professor
Hal Morris, Erin Monforti, and all of the talented members of this year’s Review
who have supported me and inspired me to become a better writer, thinker, and
listener.
1 Fox 13 Tampa Bay, Gabby Petito Case: Full Utah Bodycam Video,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCGsW41aQEw.
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flickering hope extinguished. 2 Following the discovery, the flood of
social media posts showcased Gabby as the newest addition to the list
of so many other victims of domestic violence, serving as a reminder
that these abhorrent acts remain a pervasive reality for many women
today.3
According to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
on average, nearly twenty people per minute are physically abused by
an intimate partner in the United States. 4 Notably, female victims
sustain injuries three times more often than their male counterparts. 5
One consequence of this violence manifests in what is known as
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). 6

2

Eyewitness News, Gabby Petito Timeline: Everything we know about her
Disappearance, ABC7 NEW YORK (Nov. 23, 2021, 12:44 PM), https://abc7ny.com/
gabby-petito-disappearance-timeline-brian-laundrie/11024821/.
3 See Shannan Catalano, Ph.D. et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected
Findings: Female Victims of Violence, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Oct. 23,
2009), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvv.pdf (providing selected findings on
statistics of female victims of violence from 2009); see also Danielle Wallace,
Gabby Petito Joins Other Missing Women Whose Partners were Investigated, FOX
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/us/gabby-petito-brian-laundriemissing-persons-cases (listing other woman either missing or found dead because of
their spouses or intimate partners, most having a history of domestic abuse).
4 National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Statistics, https://ncadv.org/
STATISTICS.
5 S.G. Smith, et al., The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey:
2010-2012 State Report, NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL
DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/violencepreventio
n/pdf/NISVS-StateReportBook.pdf.
6 See Alexander Detchelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards
Men: Overcoming Societal Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting
Responsible Legislation, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 249, 251 (2003) (acknowledging
that Battered Woman Syndrome’s exclusion of male victims creates a disparity in
the protection and support afforded to male victims of domestic violence under the
law). Since BWS is currently de facto denied as a legal defense to male victims, this
Comment will focus solely on female victims with the hopes that change will come
for male victims.
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In 1979, Lenore Walker proposed the concept of BWS.7 She
described it as consisting of “the pattern of the signs and symptoms
that have been found to occur after a woman has been physically,
sexually, and/or psychologically abused in an intimate relationship,
when the partner . . . exerted power and control over the woman to
coerce her into doing whatever he wanted.” 8 This theory has since
developed and is now also associated with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.9 Outside of the judicial system, BWS helps explain the
“whys”—why she stayed, why she thought she was in danger, why she
recanted, why she resorted to violence, why she went back, why she
committed the crime—that mystify the public in cases like Gabby
Petito’s.10 But inside the courtroom, BWS has emerged as a common
legal defense.11 While BWS has historically been used in homicide
cases, it has increasingly been used to aid in providing a defense of
duress to a myriad of criminal cases.12
The duress defense has two elements: (1) reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious injury, and (2) the absence of reasonable,
7 John McClennen, Ph.D., et al., The Battered Woman Syndrome, SOCIAL
WORK AND FAMILY VIOLENCE: THEORIES, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 184
(Springer 2017).
8 Id.
9 Michelle Strucke & Kate Hajjar, Battered Woman Syndrome, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW (2010), https://courses2.cit.cor
nell.edu/sociallaw/student_projects/BatteredWomanSyndrome.htm.
10 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“The
law must finally step up to the times and itself comprehend the reality of domestic
violence cases which involve victims of battered woman's syndrome. If the law does
not keep up with the times in this area, a system whose raison d'être is justice will
mete out injustice under the guise of unenlightened rationalizations.”).
11 See Strucke, supra note 9 (explaining that use of Battered Woman Syndrome
as evidence of self-defense in homicide cases is currently admissible in seventy-six
percent of states, 39 states as of 2000).
12 Id.; see Susan D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self-Defense: The Use of Battered
Woman Syndrome in Duress Defenses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 955, 957–58 (1994)
(listing instances where defendants have raised evidence of battered woman
syndrome to support defense of duress for committing crimes like forging checks to
pay bills, steal food or other items denied to children involved in the relationship,
selling drugs fuel the abuser’s addictions, and other crimes against third parties).
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legal alternatives to committing the crime. 13 Hence, when battered
women commit crimes while under the control of their abuser’s threats
of or actual violence, the battered woman is now presumed to have
acted under duress.14 Women suffering from BWS are often coerced
by their abusers—directly or indirectly—to commit crimes. Typically,
these women are intimidated into committing crimes (usually theft or
other drug-related offenses)15 against third parties.16 The victims
commit these crimes because of the immense pressure to comply with
their abuser’s demands to prevent further abuse. One advocate of
allowing BWS as evidence of duress aptly stated, “battered women
live in continual, unpredictable insecurity and terror, fostered by the
presence of escalating violence.”17 Further, experts have “equated the
experience of a battered woman with that of a hostage or prisoner of
war.”18 One such woman is Marjory Dingwall.
Dingwall was a single mother recovering from alcohol abuse
when she moved in with her soon-to-be-abuser, Aaron Stanley.19 After
a string of violent physical and emotional attacks, Dingwall was
coerced into committing three robberies at Stanley’s behest.20
Eventually, this string of criminal activity lead to Dingwall’s arrest. 21
In the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin, Dingwall was charged with three counts of robbery and
three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. 22
While she admitted to the robberies, she claimed to have committed
13

United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).
Kelly Grace Monacella, Supporting a Defense of Duress: The Admissibility
of Battered Woman Syndrome, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 699 (1997).
15 Lenore E. Walker, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 109, 142 (1984).
16 Distinguishable from crimes committed against their batterers, such as
homicide.
17 Monacella, supra note 11 at 699.
18
Id.
19 United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 747–48 (7th Cir. 2021).
20 Id. at 748–49.
21 Id. at 749.
22 Id. at 745.
14
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them under duress—in fear of brutal violence at the hands of,
Stanley.23 Thus, Dingwall filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling on
evidence to support her duress defense, including expert evidence on
battering and its effects.24 The district court denied Dingwall’s
motion,25 reasoning that “even if Dingwall’s evidence were credited,
the duress requirements of imminence and of no legal alternatives
could not be satisfied.”26 The district court judge also observed the
absence of circuit precedent on the issue and stated he was looking
“forward to seeing what the Seventh Circuit says about it.”27 On
appeal in United States v. Dingwall, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s judgment, holding that the immediate physical presence
of a threat is not always essential to find a duress defense.28 Further,
any expert evidence of battering and its effects may be permitted to
support a duress defense.29 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that it could
inform the jury how an “objectively reasonable” person under the
Defendant’s circumstances might act.30 In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit joined the District of Columbia, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 31 On
the other end of the spectrum, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits hold the
contrary belief that evidence of battered woman’s syndrome should be
excluded from duress defenses.32
This Comment will address the current circuit split with emphasis
on the Seventh Circuit’s case of United States v. Dingwall.33 Part I will
examine the legal rules surrounding duress and how BWS has
developed into an important evidentiary tool for woman claiming this
23

Id.
Id. at 746.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 750.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 746.
29
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 746.
33 Id. at 745.
24
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defense. This section will also acknowledge the myriad of critiques
surrounding BWS and how the use of expert testimony legitimizes its
use in criminal courtrooms. Part II analyzes how the various circuits
have interpreted BWS as evidence in duress claims resulting in a split
among them. Part III analyzes the Seventh Circuit case of Dingwall,
and how this court of appeals reached the correct decision.
I.

ESTABLISHING DURESS: THE APPLICATION AND RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH BWS
A. The Legal Rules of Duress

Although duress is sometimes used in civil law settings (such as
defending against the enforceability of contracts), BWS is most
commonly employed in the criminal context. 34 That being said, many
courts, scholars, and even the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) have
defined and interpreted duress. According to the Supreme Court, the
defense of duress “may excuse conduct that would otherwise be
punishable.”35 This is because the defendant “nevertheless acted under
a threat of greater immediate harm that could only be avoided by
committing the crime charged.”36 To present a duress defense, the
defendant must produce evidence that (1) “she reasonably feared
immediate death or serious bodily harm unless she committed the
offense;” and (2) “there was no reasonable opportunity to refuse to
commit the offense and avoid the threatened injury.” 37 In addition, to
satisfy a threshold showing of a duress defense, “a defendant must
34

See Christopher A. Jensen, Duress: A Breach-of-Contract Defense in
Minnesota, THE JENSEN LITIGATION FIRM PLLC (Jun. 29, 2020), https://www.jensen
lawmn.com/duress-coercion-defense; see also The Tormey Law Firm, LLC,
Battered Woman Syndrome: A Pattern of Abuse, A Form of Evidence, BLOG (Sept.
27, 2021), https://www.njrestrainingorderlawyers.com/blog/battered-womansyndrome-a-pattern-of-abuse-a-form-of-evidence/ (stating BWS can be used in both
the criminal and civil setting).
35 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 (2006).
36 United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).
37 Id.
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introduce sufficient evidence as to all the elements of the defense.” 38 It
should also be noted, that the duress defense uses the term
“reasonable” twice. 39 First, in terms of the defendant's reasonable fear
of harm; and second, in terms of whether a reasonable and legal
alternative was available. 40 The MPC also interprets the use of
reasonableness stating it as an affirmative defense where the actor
engaged in the conduct “because he was coerced to do so by the use
of, or threat to use, unlawful force against his person . . . that a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to
resist.”41 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has held that “reasonableness
is the touchstone of a duress defense . . . Whether an alternative is
reasonable turns on whether a reasonable person would have availed
herself of it.”42 In a similar vein, expert evidence on battering and its
effects may give a jury useful insight about the situation in which a
person of reasonable firmness finds herself unable to avoid
committing crime.43 Applying an objective or subjective standard to
expert testimony is one of the primary causes for the circuit split on
cases involving use of expert testimony on BWS to prove duress.
1. Reasonable Fear of Imminent Violence
A wealth of precedent explains the requirements for fulfilling the
first requirement of showing duress. To begin, Supreme Court
precedent suggests that any defendant who presents a duress defense
must show that they stopped committing the crime as soon as the
claimed duress “lost its coercive force.” 44 In addition, the Seventh
38

United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 588 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Dixon,
548 U.S. at 17 (holding a defendant must establish duress defense by preponderance
of evidence).
39 United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2021).
40
Id.
41 Model Penal Code § 2:09(1) (1985).
42 United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
43 Id. at 1137; MPC § 2:09.
44 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-13, (1980).
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Circuit has explained that there must be evidence that the threatened
harm was “present, immediate, or impending.” 45 Furthermore, the
D.C. Circuit has held that “reasonableness—under both the imminence
prong and the no-reasonable alternative prong—is not assessed in the
abstract.”46 While some circuits believe this is evaluated on a
subjective basis, several others have rejected this notion.47 In essence,
these courts implement a much more rigid objective standard. Yet, the
general consensus agrees that to fulfill this element, a defendant must
show that they committed the crime strictly while under a coercive
influence and was afraid of adverse and violent consequences if they
did not do so.
2. Lacked a Reasonable Alternative to Breaking the Law
According to the Supreme Court, legal alternatives to violating
the law (such as a chance to refuse to do the criminal act and the
option to avoid the threatened harm) will undue a duress defense.48 In
response, many of the circuits believe expert testimony is crucial for a
jury to evaluate whether victims of BWS truly believed they had no
options to avoid violence from their abusers. Contrary to this, several
circuits believe evidence of the defendant’s individual circumstances
cut against duress’s objective standard and should not be admitted at
all on this point.49
B. Establishing Battered Woman Syndrome
Dr. Lenore Walker, a psychology professor at Nova Southwestern
University College of Psychology coined the phrase “Battered Woman
45

United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 1991).
Nwoye, 824 F.3d at 1137.
47 See discussion infra Section II.
48 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 411 (1980); see also United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th
744, 758 (7th Cir. 2021) (listing options Dingwall could have taken such as escape,
calling for help, or refusing to commit the crime).
49 See discussion infra Section II.
46
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Syndrome” in the late 1970s and developed a theory and method for
identifying and diagnosing this condition. 50 Walker argued that
abusive relationships trap women in a three-stage “cycle of violence”
that often prevents women from seeking help. 51 Walker’s first stage in
the cycle is called “tension-building,” wherein a woman experiences
minor physical violence and verbal attacks from her abuser. 52
Accordingly, the abused woman tends to minimize the importance of
these incidents, and often blames herself for the abuse.53 As a result,
the woman attempts to placate her batterer and act in ways that she
believes will prevent physical violence, like walking on egg shells and
not express their thoughts or feelings.54 This stage can last for years. 55
As minor incidents progressively become more frequent, pressure
increases until the woman can no longer appease her batterer. This
leads to Walker’s second stage in the cycle referred to as “acute
battering incidents”56 or violent episode phase.57 By this point,
50

See Walker supra note 15 at XV. The concept of “Battered Women
Syndrome” was first coined by Dr. Lenore E Walker. Originally, her work focused
on the idea of “learned helplessness” as the defining characteristic of a battered
woman, explicitly why the woman believes she lacks control over her situation and
feels it is impossible to escape, even if escape is a feasible possibility. In the 1990s,
Walker revised her idea of BWS as being a subset of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder. Then, in the 2000s, Walker added three additional criteria to the
identification of BWS that do not exist for other forms of PTSD; see Mary Dutton,
Update of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” Critique, NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. FOR
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2009), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/
files/2016-09/AR_BWSCritique.pdf.
51 See Dutton, supra note 50 at 2.
52 Id.
53 See Women’s Center-Youth & Family Services, Cycle of Violence, (2021),
https://www.womenscenteryfs.org/index.php/get-info/prevention/education/14cycle-of-violence (listing emotions women often feel during this phase, such as
hopelessness, fear, embarrassment, humiliation, disgust, and depression).
54 Id.; see also Exploring Your Mind, Lenore Walker’s Cycle of Abuse, (July 6,
2020), https://exploringyourmind.com/lenore-walkers-cycle-abuse/ (explaining how
after every incident of minor aggression, the aggressor’s “tension” increases, and the
victim’s “apparent passivity” can actually provoke the aggressor).
55 See Exploring Your Mind, supra note 54.
56 Dutton, supra note 50 at 2.

68

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

incidents of violence become so severe that the woman begins to fear
major physical injury or death. 58 Walker suggests it is the more
obvious lack of control and its major destructiveness that distinguishes
this from those that occur in the first stage. 59 She compares the
abuser’s temperament to Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, where he acts out of
control and has a deliberate desire to hurt and act irrationally.60
The final stage is known as the “honeymoon phase,” which begins
almost immediately following the battering incident. 61 This stage is
often characterized by the batterer’s lack of violence and showing of
what Walker calls “contrite, loving behavior.”62 Throughout this phase,
the batterer is “charming and apologetic” as he begs for forgiveness.63
The batterer states that he will never hurt the woman again, and
usually tries to take some action—such as giving up alcohol—as a
gesture of goodwill.64 Walker argues that such repeated cycles of
violence can cause a woman to develop “learned helplessness.”65
According to Walker, the woman believes that she lacks control over
her situation and believes escape is impossible—even if it is in fact a
possibility.66 The woman becomes increasingly passive, and her
motivation and will to leave the relationship diminish.67 Because she

57

See Women’s Center-Youth & Family Services, supra note 53.
Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Rebecca D. Cornia, Current Use of Battered Woman Syndrome:
Institutionalization of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J.
99, 103 (1997).
63 April Paredes, et al., Domestic Violence, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 266, 282
(2018).
64 See Women’s Center-Youth & Family Services, supra note 53 (describing
how women in these situations often hope and believe these changes will last, even
to the point of denial over the seriousness of the incidents).
65 Paredes, supra note 62 at 282.
66 Id.
67 Id.
58
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cannot leave the relationship, the woman suffers more abuse and
remains “trapped in the cycle of violence.” 68
While this model is widely recognized as the standard for
understanding BWS,69 there is an array of criticisms towards Walker’s
interpretation and use of BWS as evidence in criminal proceedings.
C. Critiques of Battered Woman Syndrome
BWS testimony can be especially useful in cases where a duress
defense is employed. However, this evidence has elicited criticism and
has been negatively perceived by many legal scholars for some of the
reasons explored below.
1. Jury Misunderstanding & Stereotypes
David L. Faigman, a staunch critic of Walker’s work, believes that
use of BWS is meant to educate the jury about the realities of domestic
violence, and notes that courts disagree whether this evidence acts as
justification or an excuse for the woman’s behavior. 70 In addition,
there is concern that juries will misconstrue BWS testimony as
suggesting that the defendant “possesses a diminished capacity or lack
of responsibility for the act.”71
In a similar vein, Cheryl A. Terrance, an Associate Professor of
Psychology at the University of North Dakota fears that BWS
testimony will create a stereotypical battered woman. In turn, this
68

Id.
Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 221 (2002)
(“Although not universally embraced by legal commentators, Walker's description of
battered women and her labeling of them as syndromatic has found widespread
acceptance. For example, the theory is taught to counselors, police officers,
prosecutors, parole board officials, and social-service providers to improve the
quality of their responses to domestic violence”).
70 David L. Faigman, Science in the Law: Social and Behavioral Science Issues
(West Group, 2002).
71 Strucke, supra note 9.
69

70
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would create a “rigid classification that may serve to exclude many
battered women whose circumstances deviate from the BWS
standard.”72 This “ideal” victim of BWS appears to be “helpless,
passive, and has no history of violent or confrontational behavior.”73
Thus, any woman that actively defends herself from a domestic abuser
will be barred from utilizing BWS as evidence should the need ever
arise; as they no longer fit the mold of a battered woman. However,
Terrance’s critiques were primarily concerned with women using BWS
as evidence in cases of self-defense—where history of the woman
protecting herself from her abuser would be pertinent. But there is no
evidence to support the assertion that using BWS as evidence for
duress defenses mandate a purely passive victim who has never
defended or attempted to defend herself from her abuser. Although a
“generalized” depiction of women suffering from BWS has emerged,
legally, there is no categorical prohibition that women submitting
BWS as evidence of duress cannot have defended themselves from
their attackers.74
2. Feminist Critique
Anne M. Coughlin, Assistant Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law
School asserts that BWS testimony (when used as evidence of an
element of defense) “paints women as irrational sufferers of a mental
health disorder incapable of self-control.”75 She compares the
application of BWS in duress cases as “reminiscent of the old marital
72

Cheryl A. Terrance, et al., Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Battered
Women Who Kill: Going Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome, 88 NORTH
DAKOTA L. REV. ART. 4 (921).
73 Pamela Jenkins & Barbara Davidson, Battered Women in the Criminal
Justice System: An Analysis of Gender Stereotypes, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 161, 169
(1990).
74 The legal elements of duress require a fear of imminent death or serious
injury and the absence of reasonable, legal alternatives. Defending oneself does not
negate the fact that a woman suffering from BWS may still experience duress even
after standing up to her attacker.
75 Strucke, supra note 9.
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coercion doctrine, which presumed that woman acted at the command
of their husbands.”76 She further explains that this suggests that
“women should not be held to the same rigorous legal standards as
men”77 and that this supports a “gender hierarchy” where men must
“control their ‘irresponsible’ wives.”78 However, this completely
overlooks the deterrent mental health effects BWS has on a woman.
Trauma does not adhere to a gendered hierarchy and preventing
victims of BWS from utilizing it as evidence to bring their abusers to
justice leaves women at a disadvantage in the legal system—not the
opposite.
3. Additional Criticisms
There are several other nebulous concerns surrounding the use of
BWS as evidence. Some criticize the lack of a standard definition,
while others complain about the evidence of scientific validity and
lacking incorporation of current research. 79 But, courts have largely
ignored these concerns and held “that scientific evidence regarding the
syndrome is sufficiently reliable to meet evidentiary standards.” 80
BWS has primarily persisted because it “conveniently packages in
a single phrase a far more complex issue” that juries need to decide in
cases of this nature.81 This evidence, coupled with expert testimony,
can explain the state of mind and behavior of a woman “who has
experienced domestic violence and who has been charged with
criminal conduct that was influenced by her history of [experiencing]

76

Burke, supra note 68 at 262 n. 218.
Strucke, supra note 9.
78 Id.
79 Dutton, supra note 50 at 7.
80 Burke, supra note 68 at 247.
81 Dutton, supra note 50 at 9 (explaining how juries “need to understand the
unique experiences of each defendant informed by the large and continually growing
body of scientific literature that is pertinent for understanding an individual’s
experience and reaction to having been exposed to domestic violence).
77
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violence and abuse.”82 Hence, BWS evidence is most impactful when
presented with expert testimony.
D. Expert Testimony Lends Credence to BWS
Including expert testimony as evidence of BWS has heightened its
reliability and become a cornerstone of support for this evidence in aid
of a duress claim. But before expert testimony about BWS is deemed
relevant and becomes admissible, the party seeking to use expert
testimony must establish that: (1) the victim is a battered woman and
(2) the jury would be aided by expert testimony to explain her
behavior.83 Once these are established, BWS testimony must pass an
admissibility test, and show that the probative value outweighs any
prejudicial impact.84 McCormick on Evidence devised a three-prong
test governing the admissibility of expert testimony.85 To pass this
hurdle, (1) the BWS testimony’s subject matter must be “so distinctly
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be
beyond the ken of average layman,” (2) the witness “must have
sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to
make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier
in his search for truth,” and (3) the expert testimony is inadmissible if
“the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a
reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.” 86 This standard
was employed in Dyas v. United States, and is widely implemented by
courts when admitting BWS as evidence for duress.87
Expert testimony is extremely important because jurors often
bring misunderstandings and biases towards battered women

82

Id.
Strucke, supra note 9.
84
Id.
85 § 13 at 29–31 (E. Cleary, 2d. ed. 1972).
86 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632–33 (1979) (citing Dyas v.
United States 376 A.2d 827, 832 (1977).
87 Dyas, 376 A.D. at 832.
83
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stemming from myths, misconceptions, and limited experiences.88
Without information to “better understand the defendant’s experiences
and behaviors,”89 juries often inaccurately evaluate and unfairly judge
defendants with these claims. 90 Also, jurors can be inclined to hold the
abuse against defendants if they had not previously reported it,
thinking that she is “not to be believed” when she later asserts that she
was abused in form of defense for breaking the law. 91 Thus, it is
essential that juries have the information to “fairly understand a
defendant’s situation.”92
Also, expert testimony on battering and its effects are accepted by
roughly 90% of the states.93 While this is generally reserved for
traditional self-defense situations, a substantial number of state courts
have allowed expert testimony in nontraditional situations such as
duress.94 In addition, two-thirds of the federal courts admitting expert
testimony have done so in duress cases.95 The Department of Justice
supported use of expert testimony, by explaining that “[d]escribing the
pattern, over the course of the relationship, of a battered woman’s
compliance in the context of the batterer’s violence or threats can

88

See Dutton, supra note 50 at 4.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 U.S. Department of Justice, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning
Batters and Its Effects in Criminal Trials: Report Responding to Section 40507 of
the Violence Against Women Act, x (1996).
94 Id.; see also Dutton, supra note 50 at 4 (listing an array of topics that can be
covered by expert testimony, including but not limited to: “domestic violence and
abuse, characteristics of abusers, the emotional and physical effects of violence and
abuse on woman and children exposed to domestic violence, women’s efforts to
protect herself and her children, and women’s use of strategies to cope with domestic
violence,” including the use and responsiveness of community resources).
95 See U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 91 at 6 (explaining that of the
states allowing expert testimony on battering and its effects believe this testimony is
relevant to the question of “why the defendant did not leave the battering
relationship or to explain other conduct, such as acts performed under duress”).
89
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provide a framework for jury evaluation of whether the alleged
criminal conduct resulted from duress or coercion.” 96
Although most courts can agree on the helpfulness of expert
testimony in understanding BWS, there is much division on admitting
this testimony as evidence.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Regardless of legal scholars’ thoughts and interpretations
regarding BWS in use of duress defenses, many circuit courts have
weighed in on the subject—causing a divide. The main point of
contention is whether the standard of duress is subjective or objective.
Both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits believe that these cases should be
interpreted through an objective lens. On the other hand, the D.C.,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all agree that reasonableness should be
viewed more subjectively. The Seventh Circuit aligned closely with
the latter circuits through their decision in Dingwall, adopting an
objective standard applied in light of specific circumstances.
Starting in 1994, the Fifth Circuit held that expert testimony in
these cases is irrelevant, because the standard for duress is objective. 97
In United States v. Willis, a woman was arrested after selling
marijuana to an undercover police officer and was found to have a gun
in her purse.98 She admitted to her involvement with the marijuana
transactions but claimed to be under duress because her boyfriend
placed the gun in her purse, and she had a fear of him from past
violence.99 At trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas excluded expert testimony concerning BWS and the
jury ultimately convicted the defendant. 100 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to show “the
coercive force of the threat was sufficient such that a person of
96

Id. at 3.
United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1994).
98 Id. at 173.
99 Id. at 174.
100 Id.
97
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ordinary firmness would succumb [and be involved in the drug
transactions and possess his gun in her purse].”101 The court also
concluded that BWS evidence was irrelevant, because it only related
to the defendant’s “weakened mental condition” 102 and expert
testimony would relate to the defendant’s personal susceptibility which
is irrelevant as the standard for duress is objective. 103 Ultimately, the
court was weary of allowing BWS testimony, fearing that it would
change the inquiry from whether “a person of ordinary firmness could
have resisted,”104 to whether “this individual woman, in light of the
psychological condition from which she suffers, could have
resisted.”105And the court was not willing to change the objective
inquiry of duress to a subjective one.
However, twelve years later, the Sixth Circuit reached a different
conclusion. In Dando v. Yukins, the Sixth Circuit reviewed a case
regarding ineffective counsel, in which a defendant’s attorney failed to
consult an expert and otherwise investigate the validity of a duress
defense based on BWS.106 In Michigan, there was no direct precedent
addressing whether BWS is relevant to a duress defense.107 So, the
Michigan Court of Appeals compared this to previous cases where
BWS was admitted for self-defense claims.108 In doing so, the court
decided that BWS should likewise be allowed when claiming duress,
because it relates to the question of whether the defendant “reasonably

101

Id. at 170.
Id.
103 Id. at 176.
104 Id. at 176.
105 Id.
106 Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 803 (6th Cir. 2006).
107 Id. at 801.
108 Id. (relying on People v. Wilson, 194 Mich. App. 599, 604, 487 N.W.2d
822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), where the Michigan Court of Appeals endorsed the use
of evidence of a defendant’s BWS “to explain how a battered spouse reacts to the
batterer, to explain the reasonableness of the battered spouse’s perception that
danger or great bodily harm is imminent, and also to rebut the prosecution’s
inference that the defendant could have left rather than [commit the crime]”).
102
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believed her life was in danger.”109 The Sixth Circuit affirmed this
holding, believing that the totality of the defendant’s circumstances
(history of abuse, comparison to BWS in self-defense cases, and
inability to get an expert’s opinion) as compelling enough for duress
citing BWS as evidence. 110 Thus, the Sixth Circuit established a more
subjective approach than the Fifth Circuit.
Ten years later, the D.C. Circuit expanded on this reasoning. In
United States v. Nwoye, the D.C. Circuit held that a “duress defense
requires a defendant to have acted reasonably under the circumstances,
and expert testimony can help a jury assess whether a battered
woman’s actions were reasonable.”111 The court further clarified that
determining if expert testimony is relevant to the duress defense “turns
on whether such testimony can identify any aspects of the defendant’s
particular circumstances that can help the jury assess the
reasonableness of her actions.”112 The D.C. Circuit cited Dr. Lenore
Walker when analyzing how expert testimony can impact the
imminent-harm prong of duress, noting how “women in battering
relationships are often ‘hypervigilant to cues of impending danger and
accurately perceive the seriousness of the situation before another
person who had not repeatedly abused might recognize the danger.’” 113
Following this, the court noted how “[r]emarks or gestures that may
seem harmless to the average observer might be reasonably
understood to presage imminent and severe violence when viewed
against the backdrop of the batterer’s particular pattern of violence.” 114
Thus, the D.C. Circuit provided a more modern and subjective
framework, emphasizing the importance of allowing BWS as evidence
accompanied by expert testimony for duress cases.
109

Id. (quoting Wilson, 194 Mich. App. at 602).
Id. at 801–02; but see Id. at 802 (Guy, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
evidence of BWS would be relevant to the defense of duress, aligning more closely
with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation).
111
United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
112 Id. at 1137.
113 Id. (quoting Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and SelfDefense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 324 (1992).
114 Id.
110

77

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/4

18

Musick: Explaining the Whys: Allowing Battered Woman Syndrome in Aid of a

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

However, two years later, in 2018, the Tenth Circuit aligned with
the Fifth Circuit, holding that duress is determined by applying an
objective lens.115 The court had no qualms about using expert
testimony to prove duress, but found failure to present sufficient
evidence for a threshold showing.116 Furthermore, the court relied on
the plain text of federal duress, which makes clear that the “legal
propriety of a defendant's assessment of, and response to, the
circumstances that allegedly have subjected her to duress is
determined by applying an objective lens-that is, a defendant's
subjective beliefs or perspectives are only relevant insofar as they are
objectively reasonable.”117 In effect, the court sided with a more
objective method.
And yet, one year later, the Ninth Circuit favored a more
subjective standard, closely resembling the D.C. Circuit. In United
States v. Lopez, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Nwoye’s proposition that
“reasonableness is not assessed in the abstract.” 118 Rather, any
assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant's actions must
consider the defendant's particular circumstances, at least to a certain
extent.119 The court was persuaded that “expert testimony on how
BWS can cause individuals to become hypervigilant to impending
harm does not . . . seek to alter the duress defense's reasonable-person
standard,”120unlike the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Willis.121
Hence, the Ninth Circuit held that expert testimony does not do away
with duress’s objectively reasonable person standard. Which brings the
analysis to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in July of 2021.122

115

United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1179.
117 Id. at 1180–1181.
118 United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1137 (D.C. Cir 2016)).
119 Lopez, 913 F.3d at 820.
120 Id. at 821–22.
121 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994).
122 United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744 (7th Cir. 2021).
116
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RECENT ANALYSIS OF BWS EVIDENCE IN
DURESS CASES
In July of 2021, the Seventh Circuit joined with the D.C., Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits in holding that evidence of BWS, including expert
testimony, can be admitted to prove a duress defense.
A. Facts of the Case
The Seventh Circuit reported the following facts. Dingwall met
Aaron Stanley while at a treatment center for alcohol abuse, and the
two began a relationship.123 At the time, Dingwall and her daughter
were living an unstable lifestyle, constantly in and out of shelters and
friends’ houses.124 So when Stanley asked Dingwall to stay with him,
she accepted.125 However, Dingwall quickly became concerned when
Stanley began using crack cocaine and turned emotionally and
physically abusive towards her. 126 Stanley began beating Dingwall,
starting with hitting and progressing to eventually “dragging Dingwall
down the stairs, breaking her nose, and boxing her ear.” 127 Soon
enough, a pattern of abuse emerged. Stanley would beat Dingwall,
apologize profusely, and then things would return to “normal” for a
while; until Stanley would fly into a rage again. 128 However, the
beatings and controlling behavior escalated once Stanley bought a
gun.129 Stanley began engaging in erratic and even more dangerous
123Id.

at 747.
Id. 747–48.
125 Id. at 748.
126 Id.; see also Jeffrey Juergens, What is Domestic Violence?, ADDICTION
CENTER (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.addictioncenter.com/addiction/domesticviolence/ (explaining that nearly 80% of domestic violence crimes are related to the
use of drugs, and that abuse of drugs rewires the chemicals in the individual’s brain
to “. . . seek out the substance, despite any future consequences of their behavior . . .
[resulting] in irrational, violent or controlling behavior within a relationship.”).
127 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 748.
128 Id.
129 Id.
124
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behavior. Some examples include: shooting the gun into the mattress
on the side where Dingwall slept, walking around the house holding
the gun, frequently looking through Dingwall’s phone, and taking her
food-stamp card thus preventing her from buying food.130 Stanley also
began robbing stores to get money for drugs.131 When he felt he was
too “hot” and ran out of money, he would insist that Dingwall owed
him money.132 Dingwall tried begging her parents for money, but they
refused.133 Out of anger, Stanley pistol-whipped Dingwall.134 And on
January 6, 2019, Stanley demanded that Dingwall rob a Stop-N-Go
gas station near Madison. 135 Stanley put his gun in her hand, and
Dingwall subsequently entered the gas station.136 Dingwall showed the
clerk the gun and “asked” for money, taking approximately $80 and
ran out.137 That night, Stanley did not hit Dingwall—sending the
message that committing the crime was a way to avoid his abuse. 138
However, the money did not last long, and Dingwall was coerced into
committing two more robberies. 139 After the third robbery, Stanley
strangled Dingwall and punched her in the face. 140 She later texted him
asking him to “please try to be nice to me. I’m so sore from this

130

Id.
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. Some of the text messages sent from Stanley to Dingwall include "hope
it all goes well can u plz lmk asap when u get ur money!!!!"; "U and ur mother need
2 figure this S*** OUT."; "I see NO reason ur mom can't deposit this f***ing
money."; "Unless ur lying." Dingwall responded, "Just F***in Kill me already."
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. Dingwall committed the second robbery while Stanley was at work. The
third robbery happened on January 8, 2019, after Dingwall received a phone call
from Stanley “yelling and demanding the rest of the money . . . [telling] Dingwall
that Mobil would be a good gas station to ‘hit.’”
140 Id. at 749.
131
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morning,” and “I’ve never been hit so hard in all my life.”141 The
police arrested Dingwall a few days after the third robbery.142
B. Procedural History
A federal grand jury charged Dingwall with three counts of Hobbs
Act robbery143 and three counts of brandishing a firearm in relation to
a crime of violence.144 In response, Dingwall filed a pretrial motion in
limine “seeking a ruling on evidence she planned to offer about
battering and its effects to support a duress defense.” 145 The evidence
included various components, including a statement from Dingwall
herself, emails and text messages exchanged between Dingwall and
Stanley, and an expert report from Dr. Darald Hanusa, Ph.D., LSAC,
of the Midwest Domestic Violence Resource Center. 146 After spending
a full day with Dingwall and applying over a dozen “standardized
measures”147 of questionnaires and checklists to evaluate her mental
state, Dr. Hanusa diagnosed Dingwall with Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and BWS.148 In his report, Dr. Hanusa summarized that
battering can transform a victim’s cognition and perception through
“loss of an assumption of safety . . . [and] development of a
‘continuum of tolerance’ . . . for abuse from the partner and
rationalization of such abuse, and increased tolerance for ‘cognitive
inconsistency’ as a means of adjusting to the partner’s unpredictable
conduct.”149 He concluded that battered women “are typically fearful
141

Id.
Id.
143 Id. (violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a): Interference with commerce by threats
or violence).
144 Id. (violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii): Firearm Penalties).
145 Id.
146
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. (diagnosing BWS based on the derivation of its definition in the DSM-5,
309.81 (2013), as “an extraordinarily extreme case of relationship abuse”).
149 Id.
142
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and off balance”150 and their efforts to lessen, reduce, and stop the
abuse can include “cajoling the abuser, engaging in self-destructive
[behaviors] including self-blame, criminal or illegal behaviors or any
other way that they can.”151 He compared women suffering from BWS
with victims of terrorism or those held hostage, as their “perception of
her situation and reality in general is changed and substantially
altered.”152 Further, he explained that this altered reality causes her
“capacity to evaluate options [to diminish] substantially” 153 and a
woman in this situation will “take whatever action that has the highest
predictability stopping the violence against her, even if—in the long
run—it is detrimental to her own wellbeing.”154 Dr. Hanusa also
explained that battered womens’ trauma challenges and changes their
basic beliefs about the world and themselves,155 causing great impact
on her perceptions of choices and the consequences of those
choices.156 Aside from better understanding a victim of BWS’
perceptions, Dr. Hanusa concluded that Dingwall “was at extreme risk
for being killed in [her relationship with Stanley].” 157 He further
concluded that Dingwall was “not in a position to question [Stanley’s]
demands to commit robbery let alone act against them, even though
she knew that these activities were illegal.” 158
Ultimately, the district court was unpersuaded by the evidence,
and concluded that Dingwall’s proffer “was not sufficient under
existing circuit precedent.”159 As a result, Dingwall pled guilty to three
150

Id.
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. This conclusion was reflected in Dingwall’s statement, where she
explained her belief that “the only thing that would predictably stop [Stanley’s]
abuse of her was to do exactly what he said, even committing robbery.”
155
Id.
156 Id. at 750.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
151
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counts of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of brandishing a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence. 160 However, Dingwall
reserved her right to appeal the denial of her motion in limine.161 She
brought this appeal before the Seventh Circuit162 which reversed and
remanded for further proceedings. 163
C. Analysis
To begin, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo,164 and
initially grappled with the admissibility of expert testimony.165 After
reviewing other circuit courts’ existing approaches to expert evidence
on BWS, the court sided with the Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits,
holding that “expert testimony on battering and its effects may be
offered in support of a duress defense because it may help a jury
understand the objective reasonableness of a defendant's actions in the
situation she faced, which included the history of violent and
psychological abuse.”166 The court reasoned that a “judge or jury must

160

Id. Dingwall’s pleas were conditional under Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2).
161 Id. at 745.
162 Id. at 750.
163 Id. at 761.
164 Decisions on the admission or exclusion of evidence are ordinarily
reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wade, 962 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th
Cir. 2020). But, because the district court denied the motion based on its
determination that, as a matter of law, Dingwall had failed to meet the requirements
to introduce evidence needed to support the duress defense, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed the case de novo. See generally United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 877
(7th Cir. 2012) (review is de novo when a defendant objects to the court's refusal to
give theory-of-defense instruction).
165 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 750–54.
166 Id. at 754; see also discussion supra Section II; Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d
791, 801 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he theory of Battered Woman's Syndrome is not at
odds with a reasonableness requirement—if anything, evidence of Battered Woman's
Syndrome can potentially bolster an argument that a defendant's actions were in fact
reasonable”); United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[I]n
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consider the defendant's situation, and the reasonableness of her
actions and choices may be considered in light of what is known about
the objective effects of such violent and psychological abuse, not on
the particular defendant but more generally.”167
The government in the case opposed this viewpoint, and urged the
court to consider a narrower standard for “objective reasonableness”168
closely resembling the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Dixon.169 But, the
court rejected this proposition, holding that “existence of a mental
condition should be admissible to help the factfinder consider how a
reasonable person with that condition may have responded to the
situation.”170 The court did agree with the government’s stance that
mental conditions are a subjective factor, and that finders of fact
cannot consider “the particular defendant’s own value judgments and
prudential calculations of the information she perceives.”171 But, the
court ultimately concluded that the “factual existence of a mental
condition is an ‘external, concrete factor’ that may be demonstrated
with evidence,”172 and the existence of the condition “carries with it
relevant factors that can assist in the reasonable person inquiry.”173
The court further delineated between objective and permissible expert
determining whether a fear is well-grounded, the jury may take into account the
objective situation in which the defendant was allegedly subjected to duress.”).
167 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 754; see also Stephanie M. Wildman & Dolores A.
Donovan, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense
and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 445-46 (1980-81) (“A reasonable man
is not likely to fear death or great bodily injury when a person advances towards him
during a verbal altercation. However, a woman who has been repeatedly beaten and
once choked into unconsciousness by her husband is likely to fear death or great
bodily injury when he advances towards her during a quarrel.").
168 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 754.
169 Dixon, 901 F.3d at 1183 (permitting consideration of only “external,
concrete factors unique to her" but not whether her "conduct has been influenced by
non-tangible psychological conditions that ostensibly alter the defendant's subjective
beliefs or perceptions.”).
170 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 755.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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evidence—those showing “battering and its effects to determine how a
reasonable person who has been battered may have perceived a
situation,”174 with subjective and impermissible evidence—to show
how the victim “actually perceived the situation.”175 Thus, the court
adopted an objective reasonableness standard, informed by the
victim’s personal situation and how that would have impacted her
decision making explained through expert testimony.
After solidifying these conclusions, the court grappled with the
two prongs of duress. First, because Stanley was not in Dingwall’s
direct proximity when committing the robberies, the court contended
with whether immediate proximity is needed to establish reasonable
fear of imminent violence.176 After looking to the other circuits’
decisions regarding this,177 and taking the Seventh Circuit’s precedent
into consideration,178 the court rejected a strict physical proximity
requirement to fulfill this prong. 179 The court reasoned that a jury

174

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 751.
177 See Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 802 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a
defendant participating in crime while accompanied by her heavily armed boyfriend
who had previously threatened her life would lead a reasonable person in her
situation to fear death or serious bodily harm); see also United States v. Nwoye, 824
F.3d 1129, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reasoning an abuser monitoring the victim’s
actions and conversations while several states away could be sufficient to establish
fear of imminent violence especially when accompanied by expert testimony
explaining the concept of hypervigilance); United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 820
(9th Cir. 2019) (“ . . . a reasonable person can nonetheless be trapped and controlled
by another at all times even if there is no overt threat of violence at any given
moment.”).
178 See United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
threatened harm must be either “present, immediate, or impending”) (emphasis
added).
179 Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 757; see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 9.7(b) (3d ed. 2020) ("[t]he danger need not be real; it is enough if
the defendant reasonably believes it to be real.").
175
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could conclude that Stanley’s conduct demonstrated “an expectation of
and level of control over Dingwall, even when physically separate.” 180
The court noted that while “proximity is not an explicit
requirement under the ‘imminence’ element,”181 it could appear
“implicit to a commonsense jury that has not heard expert evidence on
battering and its effects and knows the defendant had a gun in her
possession.”182 Thus, the court emphasized the importance of allowing
expert testimony, because it can help a jury evaluate the
reasonableness of the victim’s beliefs and actions regarding threats of
violence.183
Next, the court considered whether Dingwall believed Stanley
would further abuse her unless she committed the offenses.184 The
objective reasonableness standard for a duress defense asks how a
reasonable person in Dingwall’s shoes would have perceived Stanley’s
demands. After reviewing Stanley’s actions towards Dingwall in
relation to the robberies,185 the court concluded that a jury could find
that Stanley’s violence, contrasted with his congeniality towards her
after complying with his demands, “showed a level of manipulation
180

Dingwall, 6 F.4th at 758–59. The court compared Stanley’s unpredictable
beatings of Dingwall and his demanding and demeaning phone calls to the
circumstances in Nwoye, where the batterer was not within the victim’s immediate
proximity, yet demanded prompt communication from her.
181 Id. at 757. (emphasis added).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 758.
184 Id.
185 The court cited the following considerations: “The day before the first
robbery, Stanley hit Dingwall in the eye socket with his gun after she failed to obtain
money from her parents. Stanley was worried he was ‘hot’ from committing several
robberies himself, drove Dingwall to a Stop-N-Go, told Dingwall it was her ‘turn,’
told her to put on a sweatshirt backwards, and put his gun in her hand. The next day,
Stanley repeatedly texted and called Dingwall angrily demanding more money. After
she committed the second robbery, Stanley was ‘nice’ to her but ‘de-mand[ed]
degrading sex.’ The next day, Stanley warned Dingwall that she better have the
remaining money by the end of the day and told her that Mobil would be a good gas
station to ‘hit.’ Even though Dingwall committed the robbery, Stanley still beat her
the morning after, strangling her in front of her daughter.”
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and a style of communication that could lead a reasonable person in
her situation to have interpreted Stanley's demands and behavior as a
threat of imminent violence unless she committed each robbery.”186
Thus, presentation of this evidence coupled with expert testimony
explaining battering and its effects on the victim would be helpful to a
jury when assessing this prong.
Finally, the court considered whether Dingwall had a reasonable
alternative to breaking the law. The government argued that because of
Stanley’s distance from Dingwall while committing the crimes, she
arguably could have “escaped, called for help, or otherwise refused to
commit each crime.”187 While the court concluded that a jury could be
persuaded by this argument, they noted that physical proximity is not
determinative of this element. 188 The court went on to explain that the
circumstances that Dingwall faced must be the focus of the analysis.189
Moreover, the court once again emphasized that “repeated abuse and
its impact on an objectively reasonable person” are crucial to this
analysis, and can be explained through expert testimony.190
Overall, the court found that Dingwall presented sufficient
evidence and should not have been denied the opportunity to offer
evidence of BWS, including Dr. Hanusa’s opinion, to support a duress
defense.
CONCLUSION
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision did not guarantee Dingwall’s
success with her duress defense, it established that evidence of BWS
and expert testimony are relevant and should be allowed to support a
duress defense.
Some courts have taken the critiques and muddied history of
BWS into consideration and have begun opting for the phrasing
186

Id.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
187
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“battering and its effects” with the belief that it is more inclusive and
less stereotypical.191 Regardless of the terminology employed to
describe those suffering from the harsh realities of domestic violence
and abuse, the Seventh Circuit’s decision has taken steps in the way of
de-stigmatizing and de-mystifying abuse, and better ensured that these
victims obtain justice.

191

Id. at n.2.
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